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Introduction 
Jens-Uwe Wunderlich and David J. Bailey 
 
Globalisation, Global Governance and the European Union 
 
Globalisation is the buzzword of our times. No other term has been used and abused 
as frequently in politics, the media and in academia. Despite that – or perhaps because 
of that – there exists little agreement on how to define globalisation, the possible 
implications of globalisation, how globalisation manifests itself or whether 
globalisation is a qualitatively new process. Globalisation, it appears, means different 
things to different people. However, despite the amazing (and still growing) variety of 
definitions a cluster of similar ideas is identifiable: 
 
Among the terms usually included in the definitions offered were, in order of 
frequency, speed and time (accelerating, rapidly developing etc.), processes and 
flows, space (encompassing ever greater amounts of it), and increasing 
integration and interconnectivity. A composite definition, therefore, might be: 
Globalization is an accelerating set of processes involving flows that encompass 
ever-greater numbers of the world’s spaces and that lead to increasing 
integration and interconnectivity among those spaces (Ritzer 2007:1).  
 
Hence, most analysts tend to agree that globalisation at its core is about 
interconnectivity and intensified transnational interaction between state actors and 
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between non-state actors. Another much-cited definition states that globalisation 
‘denotes a shift in the spatial form of human organisation and activity to 
transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of 
power’ (Held 1997: 3). This has implications for the structure of international affairs. 
Here as well, the academic debate has become polarised between hyperglobalisers 
such as Kenichi Ohmae (1996) who pronounced the dawn of a ‘borderless world’ and 
the continuous decline of the sovereign nation-state as a reference point for the 
political, economic and social organisation of human organisation, and their 
detractors. For hyperglobalisers, national governments find themselves  with little 
autonomy or capacity to act effectively as they are increasingly sidelined by global 
capital and reduced to becoming ‘market states’, existing merely as providers of a 
legal framework for market forces to operate more effectively (Strange 1996). 
Globalisation is also enhancing transnational problems that are beyond the scope and 
scale of individual states to deal with effectively. These include, for instance, 
environmental degradation (such as pollution, exploitation of the global fisheries, 
global warming), transnational pandemics (such as SARS and HIV), transnational 
crime (such as human trafficking and the drugs trade) and new transnational security 
issues (such as refugee movements and international terrorism). 
 
The detractors from this school of thought highlight the agency of states in unleashing 
the economic forces that characterise economic globalisation.1 Rather than being a 
‘force of nature’, contemporary globalisation here is viewed as the outcome of a 
political project that has created a framework for economic neoliberalism to flourish 
                                                 
1 It should also be mentioned that the thesis of the ‘decline of the state’ is nothing new. It can be traced 
back to the 19th century and the writings of Marx and Engels. 
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(Wunderlich and Warrier, 2007: 10). Or as Hay (2006) argues, states like the United 
States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) were instrumental in putting in place the 
current neoliberal infrastructure that facilitates economic globalisation. And states 
remain in a key position in international relations. To date, there is no other entity that 
is able to organise social, political and economic energies in the way national 
governments still can do by enforcing their authority, generating loyalty and 
appealing to a sense of shared identity (Maull 2000). Hyperglobalisers often seem to 
overlook that states retain a primacy and significance in international relations, 
including in international organisations such as the Word Trade Organisation (WTO) 
or the United Nations (UN). Far from being passive recipients of economic 
globalisation, national governments have, for their own purposes, actively fostered an 
international climate propagating a neoliberal agenda.  
 
It also needs to be recognised that much of the literature highlighting the decline of 
the nation-state is working with an unrealistic premise, namely that at some point in 
the past the state possessed levels of nearly complete authority and dominance over 
domestic and international forces that have now been lost due to the influence of 
globalisation. Such a reading, of course, represents a grossly over-simplified 
understanding of the contemporary nation-state and is based on an erroneous 
conception of the historical evolution of the Westphalian state-system. The modern 
nation-state consists of a range of different institutions, fulfilling various functions, 
providing the highest level of authority over a specific territory and a particular 
population. Not being able to practise a traditional function, such as trade protection, 
should not be confused with a structural decline of the power of the state: ‘Changing 
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function, or indeed a net reduction of function, does not logically equal overall decline 
unless one takes a narrow and strictly functional definition of the state’ (Bisely, 2007: 
65). It needs to be recognised that while restraining the functions of the state in some 
areas, globalisation has also provided the state with the opportunities to enhance its 
powers in others. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the sphere of domestic 
security. Here, globalisation has not diminished state power at all but, on the contrary, 
it has been a clear source of strengthening state capacity ((Bisely, 2007: 73).  
 
Whilst states have by no means been sidelined or surpassed, it is important to 
recognise that globalisation is changing the environment in which states find 
themselves. It is forcing us to rethink our traditional conceptions of world politics, 
which have been dominated by an emphasis on the state as the central actor and the 
main focus of analysis. The so-called high politics -- diplomacy, geo-political and 
security issues – have been the main issue areas in the study of world politics. Indeed, 
International Relations as an academic discipline has, traditionally, prioritised the 
study of relations between states. The multifaceted and complex nature of 
globalisation, however, implies that this is no longer tenable. Globalisation is 
enhancing the salience of low politics issues such as financial crises, trade flows, 
migration and environmental change. New actors have gained international 
significance and need to be recognised as international actors in their own right. 
Examples include multinational enterprises, investment banks, non-governmental 
organisations, and global and regional institutions such as the United Nations. New 
issue areas, such as global terrorism and global environmental change, have entered 
the agenda of international relations and more traditional ones, such as security, have 
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undergone a paradigm shift. The concept of human security, for instance, has become 
of relative importance. This has practical implications as the discussions surrounding 
the rights and wrongs of humanitarian intervention highlight. 
 
Globalisation is putting a question mark on the normative foundations of the state 
system. The Westphalian model based on an explicit connection between sovereignty 
and territory is past its sell-by date. Individual states find their autonomy to set 
independent national objectives increasingly compromised. The formal institutional 
framework of the Westphalian state system based on exclusive territorial sovereignty 
is breaking and is increasingly being replaced with a more flexible global multilevel 
governance structure. Sovereignty, and with it the Westphalian model, are under 
pressure as the defining and normative foundations of world politics. Globalisation is 
transforming the organisation of society; it is opening up new spaces and it is creating 
new challenges. Consider, for instance, deterritorialisation, a feature and consequence 
of globalisation, which has increased pressure for the creation of various forms of 
post-sovereign governance.   
 
There has been an expansion in the authoritative functions of international regulative 
regimes and international organisations (international and global governance). There 
are also devolutionary trends with the transfer of decision-making power from the 
central government to the municipal and the provincial levels as the result of pressures 
from ethnic- and identity-based groups below state level. None of this, however, 
implies the end of the state. Rather, in a changing environment states are adapting to 
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protect themselves from the negative fallouts of globalisation and to protect their 
national interests. 
 
In response to these changes, academic literatures have also moved beyond the state-
centric model of world politics effectively broadening the analysis to include other 
actors at the global stage such as international institutions, non-governmental 
organisations, multinational companies, transantional advocacy networks, civil 
society and regional institutions. And it is in relation to this that we speak of ‘global 
governance’ which, very broadly conceived, refers to governance without the 
existence of an overarching sovereign authority.2 Global governance scholars tend to 
focus on a broader range of issues rather than traditional security concerns, and this 
includes capital and financial flows, patterns of international trade, environmental 
issues, international regimes, international law, migration movements and human 
rights, to name but a few.3  
 
The emerging global governance system, therefore, moves beyond state-centrism in 
international relations. It is characterised by five features: 
 First, it is a multilayered multilevel system where decision-making power is 
dispersed between the global level (through organisations such as the UN or 
the WTO), the wider international level (through organisations such as the 
OECD), the regional level (through regional organisations such as the EU, 
                                                 
2 For a good overview of the finer subtleties and contestations surrounding the conceptualisation and 
definition of global governance see Hoffmann and Ba (2005: 1). 
3 Examples of this global governance literature include Rosenau and Czempiel (1992), O. Young 
(1999), Cooper, English Thakur (2002), Behrens (2002), Ba and Hoffmann (2005) and Telò (2009). 
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ASEAN or Mercosur), the transnational level (through civil society actors, 
business networks, advocacy networks, political elites etc.), the national level 
(through governmental authorities) and the substate level (through municipal 
and community authorities, city council, subnational regions).4  
 Second, it suggests the development of a more cooperative international 
system. Although sovereignty remains one of the key norms of this system it 
is tempered by other liberal principles such as a commitment to some form of 
democracy and free market principles and, perhaps even more importantly, an 
emerging consensus on the centrality of human rights principles.  
 Third, it is a multiple actor system. States, while still being central actors, are 
no longer considered the only international actors of interest to International 
Relations scholars.  
 Fourth, the system ‘is structurally complex, being composed of diverse 
agencies and networks with overlapping (functional and/ or spatial) 
jurisdictions, not to mention differential power resources and competencies’ 
(Held and McGrew 2002, p. 9).5  
 And, last but not least, the regional level and regional institutions have 
become integral parts of the complex multilevel and multi-actor framework of 
global governance.  
 
It is with these points in mind that we need to turn out attention to European 
integration and the European Union. European integration, and the EU that has been 
                                                 
4 See Scholte (2000). 
5 For point one and three of the elaborations above also see Held and McGrew (2002). 
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created by it, should not be viewed as autonomous projects. The EU is ultimately 
embedded in the global governance structure, driven by geopolitical change and 
globalisation in multiple and complex ways. And, importantly, the EU can be 
regarded as a case study of multilevel governance, the successful management of 
globalisation or international actorness beyond the state. It is, therefore, an important 
repository that can facilitate a better understanding of the evolving global governance 
framework and contemporary world politics in general.  
 
The EU and Global Governance 
 
To date, the EU is the most evolved and most highly institutionalised experiment in 
regionalism. It also represents the largest concentration of economic power in the 
global arena. In terms of combined population and human resources and trade and 
finance it can be considered to be at the very least an equal of the current global 
economic powerhouses of the United States (US), China or India. Furthermore, it has 
created a unique zone of peace and stability. Not a mean achievement considering the 
rather unpleasant history of Western Europe, which has twice been at the centre of 
destructive modern warfare. Patterns of rivalry and enmity that characterised the 
international relations of Western Europe until 1945 have effectively been 
transformed into a set of relationships largely characterised by amity and cooperation 
between the member states of the European Union. Almost sixty years of institutional 
development, several waves of enlargement and various treaty revisions has created a 
unique experiment in multilateral international governance at the European level. It is 
a unique entity that sits somewhere between being a conventional international 
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organisation and a state. Indeed, there has been much confusion in determining the 
character of the EU. State in the making, civilian, normative and market power are 
expressions that have been used to describe the external character of the EU. 
However, none of them describes the complexity of the EU in its entirety.  
 
Nonetheless, these ideas are indicative of the external power of the EU. Without 
doubt, it is an important power in the evolving global governance framework and it is 
increasingly recognised as such. In particular, the EU serves as a significant reference 
point for regional initiatives in the global arena within the global governance 
framework. Its longevity is unprecedented for such an experiment in regional 
integration, as is its complexity, combing political and economic integration. Simply 
by existing, the EU demonstrates stability and security and the successful 
management of globalisation. However, regionalism is not confined to Europe and the 
EU. Since the Single European Act (SEA) and the subsequent revival of European 
integration, the world has witnessed a resurgence of regionalisms around the world. 
Examples include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur 
(Comisión Sectorial para el Mercado Común del Sur), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), the African Union, a new assertive ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the developing ASEAN Plus Three 
framework (including South Korea, Japan and China)6, the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). This new 
regionalism is driven by the geopolitical shifts following the end of the Cold War and 
the contemporary wave of globalisation. The emphasis on trade liberalisation and 
                                                 
6 Perhaps more aptly called ‘Three Plus ASEAN’, as Jones and Smith (2007: 181) observed.  
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international financial deregulation and a general increase in transboundary activities 
is undermining the autonomous policy-making capacity of many states in political, 
social and economic affairs. As a result, regional spaces and institutions have emerged 
as an important level in the emerging multilevel global governance structure 
(Wunderlich 2007: 29). 
 
The new regionalism is fostering regional stability, regional policy cooperation, 
regional economic convergence and regional political cooperation and, thus, forms a 
new and important building bloc within the global governance complex. Due to its 
character and its success the EU is the natural reference point (if not blueprint) for the 
construction of regional arrangements. However, far from being just a passive model 
the EU also has and is actively fostering regionalism in other parts of the world. It has 
created a web of interregional relations (for instance with ASEAN and Mercosur, to 
mention but two) and thus facilitated the creation of yet another layer in the global 
multilevel governance framework – interregionalism. This can be regarded as a 
deliberate strategy to strengthen regional entities and foster interregionalism, thereby 
enhancing its own visibility, influence and identity. It can also be regarded as a 
deliberate strategy designed to prevent national retrenchment as a response to the 
many crises triggered and exacerbated by globalisation. Hence, the EU can be 
regarded as an important actor within the global multilevel governance framework. 
 
European integration has created a unique framework for policy-making where 
decision-making power is dispersed across the local, the regional (micro-), the 
national and the European levels. It has facilitated the creation of a much more diverse 
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and multilayered political space where levels of authority overlap. This policy-making 
environment has enabled non-state actors to assert much more influence in decision-
making processes to the extent that they have now joined state agency in many areas 
of policy-making. This EU multilevel governance framework emphasises the fluidity, 
interconnectivity and transboundary nature of actors and institutions involved in 
regulatory and political decision-making. It seeks to overcome the inadequacies of the 
Westphalian model in dealing with the manifold challenges arising out of an 
increasingly interconnected and globalised world. Thus, the EU policy-making 
environment represents a unique case study of experiments in governance beyond the 
state and can be regarded as an important reference point for the organisation of the 
global governance system.  
 
In addition, the EU has emerged as a new and multidimensional actor in world 
politics, actively shaping and influencing the emerging global governance complex. 
As such, it forces us to reconsider conceptions of actorness in the discipline of 
International Relations, which still predominantly focuses on the Westphalian model 
and the sovereign state. Not being a state, the EU’s actorness is not so much 
determined by sovereignty but rather by a mixture of institutional identity, presence 
and capacity (see Wunderlich’s contribution to this volume). Of course, this claim is 
not entirely uncontested. The EU often appears as a rather ambiguous entity, lacking 
consistency and coherence. The reasons for which are partly to be found in the 
internal institutional structure representing a precarious balance between two 
competing logics – Westphalian/ intergovernmental and post-Westphalian/ 
supranational.  
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This volume seeks to present a unique and timely overview of the multiple 
interactions, policies and impacts of the EU within the wider global arena. It goes 
beyond a narrow understanding of the EU’s international relations or its foreign 
policies, to focus on a much wider array of factors and influences. The term 
‘international relations’ appears to be far too restrictive given the complexities of 
contemporary world politics. Rather than a focus on international relations, therefore, 
this volume focuses on ‘global governance’, by which it seeks to denote a widening of 
the issues, actors and processes under consideration.  
 
Structure of the Volume 
 
The volume is divided into four distinct thematic parts. The first part provides an 
overview of attempts to theorize the process of regional integration in terms of how it 
relates to the notion of global and/or transnational (regional) governance. The second 
part focuses on the internal dimension, looking particularly at theoretical and 
empirical developments in the European institutions with specific regard to the 
question of global governance. Part three focuses on the most relevant policy areas in 
terms of the European Union’s engagement with wider questions of global 
governance. Finally, part four presents a series of chapters highlighting the way in 
which the European Union has sought to engage with both third countries/regions and 
international organizations, creating and/or adapting current structures of global 
governance in the process.  
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As noted, the chapters that form the first part of the handbook discuss alternative 
theoretical approaches to European integration, with particular reference to what this 
means for patterns of global governance. The aim with each of the chapters, therefore, 
is to consider both what the process of European integration can tell us with regard to 
general developments in patterns of global governance, and to consider the extent to 
which global governance trends impact upon European integration. This is therefore a 
two-way learning process, a point made by Alex Warleigh-Lack in his chapter in the 
present volume. Indeed, in Warleigh-Lack’s chapter we find a convincing argument 
that the theoretical debates already undertaken by European studies scholars can be 
used to inform important debates within international relations. At the same time, EU 
studies can learn through an engagement with the important debates within the IR 
literature on issues related to globalisation and global governance.  Lee Miles 
addresses similar issues in his chapter, where he also goes on to argue that we can see 
important overlaps between the arguments and claims made within both the EU 
studies literature and that focusing on global governance. This, he argues, is 
particularly the case if we consider the ‘fusion thesis’ approach that has developed 
within the European integration literature. In identifying these common points of 
departure, however, Miles shows how we can also identify a number of important 
gaps between the two sets of literatures. There are a number of absences in one or 
both of the literatures that we might be inspired to fill as a result of comparing the two 
related bodies of work. Whilst the Warleigh-Lack and Miles chapters identify room 
for mutual inspiration between the European integration and global governance 
literature, therefore, the two chapters by Björn Hettne and Uwe Wunderlich both 
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consider the theoretical and conceptual apparatus that has developed amongst those 
seeking to understand the process of regionalism and region-building. This is both 
with regard to the European region, but also as has occurred in other regions around 
the globe. As the European Union tends to be considered the most integrated of the 
‘macro-regions’ globally, it has also on a number of occasions tended to be viewed as 
something of a template for regionalism elsewhere (both for academic scholars and 
political practitioners). In the Wunderlich chapter, therefore, we see a specific focus 
on the construction of ‘actorness’. Whilst in the Hettne chapter we witness a 
discussion of the tensions that exist between integrating and disintegrating pressures 
within the European Union. The final chapter in part one considers some of the 
attempts to introduce critical theories to the study of European integration and EU 
external relations. Here, David Bailey shows how some of the insights of these critical 
theoretical approaches can (and have) help(ed) us to produce an alternative 
perspective on the European Union’s position within emergent patterns of global 
governance. 
 
The second part of the handbook focuses both on the way in which the major 
European Union institutions have dealt with the question of global governance, and 
how scholars have sought to conceptualise and theorise this process. Thus, the chapter 
by David Spence discusses the opportunities and challenges facing the Commission in 
its attempt to engage with issues of global governance. In the chapter by Giacomo 
Benedetto we turn our focus to the European Parliament. Here Benedetto highlights 
some of the important institutional developments that arise at the supranational level. 
As the European Parliament is the most advanced attempt at constructing a 
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transnational/supranational institution of representative democracy we are particularly 
interested in what this might suggest with regard to general patterns of global 
governance and the potential for it to be democratic. As Benedetto shows, the 
increased size of the European Union has created a Parliament characterised by 
numerous national and linguistic groups, which has in turn created a tendency for 
consensus to be privileged over competition. Benedetto also highlights the way that 
the European Parliament has developed a number of limited foreign policy 
competences, which indicates the manner in which transnational/supranational 
institutions of representative democracy might play a role within patterns of global 
governance. Further, in discussing the role of the Council of the European Union, 
Uwe Puetter highlights three important roles with regard to the European Union’s 
position within contemporary global governance. First, the Council has the capacity to 
pass legislation that has an important impact upon patterns of global governance, most 
notably through the adoption of a supranational customs and commercial policy. 
Second, the Council is able to coordinate a number of member states’ policies – most 
notably their foreign policies – in areas where they might not be able to adopt 
legislation. Third, the Council acts to represent the European Union in a number of 
both formal and informal international organizations. Puetter goes on to reflect on 
what we might take from these observations, and the wider theoretical debates 
concerning the role of the Council. This includes both a more general consideration of 
contemporary patterns of, and potential trajectories for, global governance. Similarly, 
Klaus Brummer’s chapter on the European Council and the Presidency shows how 
some of the working patterns and power relations witnessed in the operation of these 
two ‘power centres’ of the EU provide us with insights into potential trends within 
alternative forms of global governance. Most notably, Brummer shows how the 
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experience of the European Council highlights the way in which a lack of codification 
of an institution’s role and its functions does not necessarily impede its ability to be 
influential within emerging institutions and relations of global governance. 
 
Whilst a number of the chapters in the second part highlight the way in which regional 
institutions might provide a template for alternative forms of global governance, 
European integration also has the potential to produce supranational institutions that 
might exist in a more antagonistic relationship with regard to alternative institutions 
of global governance. In particular, in his chapter on the European Court of Justice, 
Adam Cygan shows how supranational law can clash with emerging international law. 
As a result, we cannot assume that different tiers of global (supranational) governance 
will always be mutually complementary.  
 
Part three of the handbook is concerned with policies that have developed at the 
European level, and which as a result have implications for wider attempts to 
understand and theorise issues of relevance for global governance. In his chapter on 
the common foreign and security policy of the European Union, therefore, Alister 
Miskimmon shows how this is one of the most central policy areas in which the EU 
both influences, and is influenced by, contemporary global governance. In particular, 
Miskimmon shows how ‘soft power’ instruments – especially the promotion of 
European norms – have enabled the European Union to be a more effective source of 
influence than would otherwise be achieved through the promotion of more military 
forms. In seeking to work with, and thereby consolidate, emerging patterns of global 
governance, the European Union is clearly both affecting, and being affected by, 
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international institutions such as NATO and the UN. Environmental policy has also 
witnessed the rise of the European Union over time, to become one of the leading 
actors within current global environmental governance relations. Thus, whereas 
earlier chapters highlight the potential antagonisms between regional and global 
governance, in her chapter on environmental policy, Magalie Bourblanc shows how 
the European Union has been keen to promote global governance, as part of the 
process of regional integration. Clearly, therefore, the relationship between the 
regional and global level has the potential to vary by both institution and policy 
sector. Indeed, we witness similar trends in Ferdi de Ville’s chapter on common 
commercial policy. Here we find that the European Union has been one of the key 
advocates of ‘positive integration’, meaning the attempt to introduce greater 
regulation at the global (WTO) level. Equally, the European Union uses its common 
commercial policy as a means by which to seek to influence the domestic policies of 
its trading partners. As such, despite a number of important internal differences that 
afflict EU decision-making in this area, common commercial policy is an important 
area where the European Union is able to have a significant impact upon the 
institutions of governance emerging at the global level. On other occasions, EU-level 
policies have had a more indirect impact upon global governance. For instance, as 
Wyn Grant’s chapter shows, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) had 
important effects upon international power relations as a result of the export subsidies 
that were often used to dispose of the agricultural surpluses resulting from that policy. 
As Grant goes on to illustrate, the CAP has subsequently had important effects, both 
directly and indirectly, upon attempts by the European Union to facilitate agreements 
of relevance to global governance. This has perhaps been most notably the case with 
the negotiations surrounding both the GATT and the WTO. 
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Other policy areas developed by the European Union have a more direct impact upon 
international power relations and trends in global governance. This can be witnessed 
in the chapters on development policy, accession policy, neighbourhood policy, and 
conflict policy. Through these empirical investigations we are able to identify a 
number of important trends. Thus, Maurizio Carbone’s chapter on EU development 
policy highlights a number of important themes that recur throughout the handbook. 
First, in his discussion of the dual role that the European Union plays in development 
policy – as both a bilateral and multilateral donor – we witness some of the ongoing 
tensions between supranational and intergovernmental pressures that arise in many 
attempts at governance beyond the nation state. Further, as Carbone shows, and 
echoing the arguments made in Warleigh-Lack’s chapter, the various interpretations 
of the EU’s development policy feed into the longstanding realist vs. idealist debates 
within international relations theory. Finally, as also noted in a number of the chapters 
in the handbook, the attempts by the European Union to work with institutions such as 
the World Bank and the WTO in the area of development policy have led to 
disagreements of opinion on whether this either consolidates or undermines EU 
influence within institutions of global governance. 
 
An Schrijvers and Eline De Ridder argue in their chapter that an examination of the 
EU’s accession policy enables a better understanding of the EU’s role in global 
governance, both because it relates to the European Union’s power and influence 
within the world, and also to the stance that the EU seeks to adopt vis-à-vis third 
countries. Thus, the chapter particularly highlights the way in which the adoption of 
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conditionality by the European Union in its relations with applicant countries reflected 
its superior power with regard to the central and Eastern European countries that 
joined in 2004/7. In discussing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Syuzanna 
Vasilyan provides a critical analysis of the historical record, policy stimuli, and the 
policy and institutional constructions that have been produced as a result. Vasilyan 
also touches on some of the questions raised in the discussion on accession policy, 
particularly over whether ENP acts to the advantage of partner countries and/or 
represents an act of ‘othering’. Finally, in their chapter on conflict transformation, 
Thomas Diez and Laurence Cooley review the alternative means by which the 
European Union has sought to intervene in conflicts – through the prospect of 
integration and through direct intervention. As their chapter shows, the ability of the 
European Union to achieve desired outcomes in these areas has been limited, due to 
problems associated with both policy coherence and the failure to fully incorporate 
local grassroots actors. 
 
The final part of the handbook focuses on the European Union’s place within 
contemporary international relations. In particular, it seeks to examine how the 
European Union fits within international institutions and relates to other countries and 
regions globally. This part therefore offers an overview of the EU’s place within the 
developing framework of global governance. Thus, Vassiliki Koutrakou’s chapter 
focuses on the European Union’s relationship with the United Nations, looking 
particularly at the area of conflict and development. As she notes, whilst EU-UN 
relations suffer from a number of important tensions – including the reluctance of the 
EU to work under UN-led operations (although it is willing to work on UN-mandated 
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operations), and the difficulties involved in securing internal coherence amongst the 
EU member states – the trajectory for global governance appears to indicate a 
tendency for more multilateral cooperation between the EU and international 
institutions such as the UN to occur over time. Similarly, in Bart Kerremans’ chapter 
on the European Union’s role in global trade and its place within the World Trade 
Organization we witness debates both between EU member states and between 
member states and the Commission over the direction of, and competence to decide 
over, trade policy. These disputes in part explain how the market power of the 
European Union can have unexpected and paradoxical implications when it seeks to 
engage with institutions of global trade governance such as the WTO.  
 
In the chapters on the European Union’s relations with third countries/regions, we are 
able to draw upon a comprehensive picture of how the EU both feeds into, and acts as 
a template for, an overall pattern of global governance. The chapter by Fredrik 
Söderbaum provides a useful introduction to this topic, discussing both the different 
types of region-to-region relationships, or ‘interregionalism’, before moving to a 
discussion of the concrete cases of EU-African, EU-Asian, and EU-Latin American 
interregionalism. As the chapter shows, the European Union’s policy towards regions 
varies according to the policy tools available to it within each context, and therefore 
also according to the particular conditions within each regional context.  We can also 
take lessons for wider trends in global governance by studying EU external relations. 
Thus, in his chapter on EU relations with the United States, Michael Smith shows 
how EU-US relations are so closely interconnected that they provide a potential 
indication of how global forms of integration might emerge, whilst also themselves 
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being major players within the emerging architecture of global governance. In Natalia 
Zaslavskaia’s chapter on EU-Russian relations we see how attempts to form a stable 
relationship have been based on both shared values and shared interests, with the 
latter prevailing in the light of the inability to find a common ground with regard to 
the former. In Mary Farrell’s chapter on EU-Africa relations we see how the EU has 
predominantly focused on promoting a neoliberal model of governance within Africa. 
Further, Farrell shows how academic analysis of this relationship has tended to focus 
on Africa as a region, to the detriment of understanding of relations at the level of 
African states (both within and between them). This therefore clearly raises questions 
about whether similar analytical trends have developed in the study of the EU’s role 
in inter-regional relations. Moreover, as Martin Dangerfield shows in his chapter, in 
studying inter-regional relations we need also to include a consideration of 
subregional cooperation – i.e. between those smaller groups of states that cooperate 
within a region – which has the potential to both coexist with regionalism and to offer 
an alternative form of cooperation to it. 
 
A number of the chapters highlight the increased global prominence of the European 
Union. For instance, in Fabienne Bossuyt’s chapter we see how Central Asia, a region 
that has long had relatively low levels of engagement with the European Union, is 
becoming increasingly important for the EU as a result of the changing role and 
power of its neighbours (particularly China and Russia). This also reflects the 
strategic importance of the region in relation to Afghanistan, and the implications of 
the region for European gas supplies. As Bossuyt shows, this increased interest led to 
a new EU Strategy for Central Asia, although the lack of means by which the EU is 
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able to coerce and/or incentivise Central Asian countries to adhere to (or adopt) EU 
norms represents an important test for the potential impact of the EU’s attempt to 
become a normative power. Julie Gilson’s chapter on the EU’s relations with East 
Asia also highlights a growing EU role. Here we see particularly how processes of 
globalization have fed into the construction of EU-East Asian relations in such a way 
that they contribute to changing global governance structures. This is a trend that is 
also echoed in Ivaylo Gatev’s chapter on the EU and Eastern Europe, where the EU 
has moved from relative indifference and non-engagement through to full 
engagement, especially as a result of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. As Gatev 
shows, enlargement has created the need for the European Union to increase its 
engagement with those Eastern European countries that form its new neighbours; this 
is particularly the case for Belarus, the Ukraine, and Moldova. The trend from relative 
indifference/non-engagement to becoming a key strategic partner can also be seen 
with regard to the EU’s relations with Latin America. As Clarissa Dri shows in her 
chapter, whilst for reasons largely related to France’s colonial history Latin America 
was not initially one of the primary focuses of EU foreign policy, it has become in 
recent years one of the most important regions in terms of the EU’s attempt to 
promote ‘normative’ or ‘soft’ power amongst third countries/regions.  This move, 
from low to high levels of third party engagement, has also witnessed a 
transformation in the means by which the European Union seeks to exert influence. 
Thus, in Michelle Pace’s chapter on the EU and the Mediterranean we see how the 
qualitative form of policymaking has also undergone a shift from ‘government to 
governance’. In particular, Pace shows, this has meant the greater importance of 
political communication and narrative in seeking to understand and explain EU-
Mediterranean relations. 
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Finally, the last chapter in the handbook, by Dawid Friedrich, shifts attention away 
from the European Union’s relations with states and/or international (state-created) 
organizations, to look at the changing relationship between the European Union and 
civil society. As Friedrich shows, in the ongoing attempt to ensure the European 
Union’s democratic legitimacy there has been an increased awareness amongst EU-
level elites that they must engage with, and enable the participation of, ‘civil society’ 
within the EU’s decision-making process. The challenge remains, however, to move 
from the virtuous language of civil society participation to the actual opportunity for 
democratic engagement by organizations that have roots within and across European 
society. The handbook ends, therefore, with a discussion of perhaps one of the most 
pressing issues facing the European Union in its attempts to engage with patterns of 
global governance: the question of how to do so whilst at the same time maintaining, 
and hopefully promoting, values of democracy, inclusion and participation that 
remain ongoing challenges for all contemporary experiments in global governance. 
 
 
 
 
